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How Did Bohr Reply to EPR? * 
Shingo Fujita 
It is rather difficult to pinpoint how Bohr replied to EPR - To such 
a degree is Bohr's reply hazy. This seems to be the general impression 
that most physists have. John S. Bell wrote in a brief essay titled "The 
Position of Bohr" (Appendix 1 to his"Bertleman's Socks and the Nature 
of Reality") as follows: 
While imagining that I understand the position of Einstein, as regards 
the EPR correlations, I have very little understanding of the position 
of his principal opponent, Bohr. Yet most contemporary theorists 
have the impression that they themselves share Bohr's views! 
He concludes the essay by censuring Bohr for committing a petitio 
principii: "Is Bohr just rejecting the premise -'no action at a distance'-
rather than refuting the argument?" It is just because, he argues, Bohr 
neglects the essential point of EPR to the effect that even if the directly 
observable first system may be disturbed by an 'uncontrollable 
interaction', the value of a physical quantity of the second system can be, 
without in any way being disturbed, predicted with certainty. 
This criticism is in line with his other one. Against EPR's criterion of 
'reality', i.e.,if, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict 
with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an 
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity, Bohr 
argues as follows. There is of course no 'mechanical disturbance' of the 
system, but "even at this stage there is essentially the question of an 
influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of 
predictions regarding the future behavior of the system!" Bell's complaint 
is simply that he cannot make sense of the passage just quoted. If it 
* Translated from a chapter of my "The Two Faces of Realism: Bohr and Bell" in 
Journal of the Philosophy of Science 27 ( 1994), Japan. I am indebted to 
Professor Joseph Johnson for correcting my English. 
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means that by different experiments on the first system different kinds of 
information are given on the second system, he argues, it just neglects 
the other point of EPR- i.e.,"one could learn either the position or the 
momentum of the second system." 
It is true that the target of Bohr's argumentation is to remove a 
premise of EPR. But what is meant to be removed is not the premise of 
'no action at a distance'. He shares this with EPR. Sharing this with EPR, 
he removes the other premise which enables the following inference: one 
could learn either the position or the momentum of the second system, 
therefore the system possesses the definite values both for the position 
and for the momentum. 
For EPR and Bell, the premise that justifies the inference is simply 
that of 'no action at a distance'. For Bohr, on the other side, a premise 
that makes the inference possible is this: a quantum system by itself 
possesses its physical properties. It is because the supposition of 'physical 
properties possessed by a system itself is not permitted that a 
measurement on the first system prescribes the very· conditions of 
preditability regarding the second one. To think that Bohr rejected EPR's 
premise of 'no action at a distance' is an utter misunderstanding on Bell's 
side. 
It is on the possibility of a delayed-choice that Bohr based his 
arguments to preserve the premise of 'no action at a distance' and, at the 
same time, to abolish the one of 'physical properties possessed by a 
system itself. To illustrate the delayed-choice, let's take a double-slit 
experiment. Did a photon come out through either one of the slits or 
through both of them simulateneously? To determine this, you have to 
either fix the first screen with a single slit so that a position-measurement 
can be made or suspend it by means of a weak spring so that a 
momentum measurement can be made. Well, there is no difference as 
regards the observable results between fixing (suspending) the first 
screen and fixing (suspending) the third screen which is waiting for the 
photon. It means that whether a photon passed through either one slit or 
both (of the second screen) can only be determined by the choice of an 
operation made after the photon has passed through. This is what is 
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called delayed-choice. If an operation made now were able to affect an 
event in the past, it would also have an instantaneous effect on the 
second system in a space-like separated region. But we cannot bring 
about the past. 
Delayed-choice is possible. But changing the past is impossible. 
This apparent contradiction can be avoided if we require that "no 
elementary quantum phenomenonis a phenomenon until it is a registered 
phenomenon" (the gist of Bohr's view as coined by John A. Wheeler). 
The contradiction seemed to ensue, only because the system itself, 
abstracted from the whole experimental arrangement, was considered to 
have physical properties or to constitute a 'phenomenon' in the past. In 
this case, as was said above, there is nothing absurd in thinking that a 
measurement on one system in the case given by EPR has 
instantaneously changed the other one in a space-like separated region. 
But there is nothing of such a kind happening. Nothing can bring about 
the past and neither can a 'spooky action at a distance' take place. 
Later in his life Bohr wrote a long essay "Discussion with Einstein 
on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics", in retrospect to what 
the issues of their ten year long discussion were and how he answered 
him. A remarkable fact about the essay is that he raises the possibility of 
a delayed-choice to the forefront and suggests that EPR's argument was 
settled when the photon box Gedankenexperiment, which Einstein had 
proposed in 1930 in order to throw doubt on the time-energy uncertainty 
relation, was solved. 
By further examining the possibilities for the application of a balance 
arrangement [suspending the photon-box] , Einstein had perceived an 
alternative procedure which, even if they did not allow the use he 
originally intended, might seem to enhance the paradoxes beyond the 
possibilities of logical solution. Thus, Einstein had pointed out that, 
after a preliminary weighing of the box with the clock and the 
subsequent escape of the photon, one was still left with the choice 
[delayed-choice] of either repeating the weighing or opening the box 
and comparing the reading of the clock with the standard time scale. 
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Consequently, we are at this stage still free to [delayedly] choose 
whether we want to draw conclusions either about the energy of the 
photon or about the moment when it left the box. Without in any 
way interfering with the photon between its escape and its later 
interaction with other suitable [mutually exclusive] measuring 
instruments, we are, thus, able to make accurate predictions 
pertaining either to the momentum of its arrival or to the amount of 
energy liberated by its absorption. Since, however, according to the 
quantum-mechanical formalism, the specification of the state of an 
isolated particle cannot involve both a well-defined connection with 
the time scale and an accurate fixation of the energy, it might thus 
appear as if this formalism did not offer the means of an adequate 
description. [All the square brackets and a long underline are added.] 
In the passage quoted Bohr does not simply exemplify EPR's 
argument by means of the photon-box example. A careful reading will 
show you that he is proposing, in the form of an exposition, his own 
answers by indicating these points: that the possibility of a 
delayed-choice is not that of changing a 'phenomenon' in the past, that a 
'phenomenon' includes an 'interaction' with a suitable measuring 
apparatus, and that all that can be spoken about (i.e.its truth and falsity 
can be asked about) in quantum mechanics ought to be called 
'phenomena'. This is why he thought it sufficed only to claim that "in the 
problem in question we are not dealing with a single specified 
experimental arrangement, but are referring to two different mutually 
exclusive arrangements." Even at the stage where EPR's essay is to be 
discussed he simply says that "the trend of the argument was in 
substance the same as that exposed in the foregoing pages." EPR's paper 
did not have an argument that presented a new kind of problem to Bohr. 
Bohr was able to share with EPR the premise of 'no action at a 
distance', just because he gave up the realist claim of postulating 'the 
physical quantities possessed by a system itself by making the 
epistemolgical switch to another realist claim to the effect that only 
'phenomena' (in his technical sense) can be spoken of in quantum 
mechanics. It was his insight into the possibility of a delayed-choice that 
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turned his resignation into a conviction. 
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